The Best Laid Plans: How Administrative Burden Complicates Voting Rights Restoration Law and Policy by Selin, Jennifer L.
Missouri Law Review 
Volume 84 Issue 4 Article 6 
Fall 2019 
The Best Laid Plans: How Administrative Burden Complicates 
Voting Rights Restoration Law and Policy 
Jennifer L. Selin 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jennifer L. Selin, The Best Laid Plans: How Administrative Burden Complicates Voting Rights Restoration 
Law and Policy, 84 MO. L. REV. () 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol84/iss4/6 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of 
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
bassettcw@missouri.edu. 
The Best Laid Plans: How Administrative 
Burden Complicates Voting Rights 





Despite significant literature on the electoral and democratic implica-
tions of laws that restore the right to vote to individuals with felony convictions, 
few scholars have explored whether these reforms result in practical changes.  
This Article examines the effect of administrative capacity and individual ex-
perience on policy implementation and finds that, even in the face of de jure 
felon rights restoration, policymakers can (knowingly or unwittingly) alter de 
facto restoration.  Specifically, states have limited administrative capacity to 
absorb the costs of rights restoration.  As a result, the burden of restoration 
falls onto citizens.  Facing learning, compliance, and psychological hurdles to 
the right to vote, many individuals with felony convictions simply do not have 
the resources to restore their civil rights.  Put simply, even the best laid plans 
often go awry when it comes to the burden of policy implementation. 
  
* Kinder Institute Assistant Professor of Constitutional Democracy, University of Mis-
souri.  I wish to thank Leah Arden, John Cusick, Alec Ewald, Lael Keiser, and Eliza 
Sweren-Becker, as well as the participants in the Missouri Symposium on Felon Dis-
enfranchisement, for helpful comments and support. 
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INTRODUCTION  
In November 2018, almost 65% of Florida voters voted “Yes” on a citi-
zen-initiated constitutional amendment to restore voting rights to citizens with 
felony convictions after they have completed their sentence (“Amendment 
4”).1  The vote is part of a national movement for disenfranchisement policy 
reform and citizen rights restoration.  Estimates suggest that, since 1997, 1.4 
million citizens in twenty three states have regained the right to vote as a result 
of legal changes to disenfranchisement policy.2 
Yet, while reforms have provided the legal opportunity for rights restora-
tion, questions remain about whether such reforms result in practical changes 
for citizens with felony convictions.  For example, in the first three months 
after Amendment 4 became effective, less than 0.2% of the citizens affected by 
the Amendment registered to vote (2,000 of 1.4 million).3  Part of this is due to 
questions among citizens and state officials regarding voter eligibility.  Kelly 
Corder, director of communications for the Florida Commission on Offender 
Review (“FCOR”) – one of the agencies tasked with identifying individuals 
eligible for restoration – noted that the agency had “temporarily postponed con-
sideration of pending applications for restoration of civil rights while the new 
framework required to implement the constitutional changes [wa]s defined.”4  
Similarly, many county elections supervisors implored the state legislature to 
  
 1. Florida Amendment 4, CNN POLITICS, https://www.cnn.com/elec-
tion/2018/results/florida/ballot-measures/1 [perma.cc/D4SF-2T59].  The resulting con-
stitutional language is as follows:  
(a) No person convicted of a felony, or adjudicated in this or any other state to 
be mentally incompetent, shall be qualified to vote or hold office until restora-
tion of civil rights or removal of disability.  Except as provided in subsection 
(b) of this section, any disqualification from voting arises from a felony convic-
tion shall terminate and voting rights shall be restored upon completion of all 
terms of sentence including parole or probation. 
(b) No person convicted of murder or a felony sexual offense shall be qualified 
to vote until restoration of rights. 
FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4. 
 2. Morgan McLeod, Expanding the Vote: Two Decades of Felony Disenfran-
chisement Reform, THE SENT’G PROJECT (Oct. 17, 2018), https://www.sentencingpro-
ject.org/publications/expanding-vote-two-decades-felony-disenfranchisement-re-
forms/ [perma.cc/Z6ND-3MXK]. 
 3. Kevin Morris, Thwarting Amendment 4, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. 1–2 (May 
9, 2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/thwarting-amendment-4 
[perma.cc/484F-M2AT]. 
 4. Daniel Rivero, No One Seems To Know How Amendment 4 Will Be Imple-
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provide them with guidance interpreting the Amendment.5  Such guidance clar-
ifying the parameters of the state’s responsibilities for administering Amend-
ment 4 did not become law until more than six months after Amendment 4 
became effective.6  Rights restoration likely will require implementing legisla-
tion and administrative action by, at minimum, the Florida Department of Cor-
rections, the Department of Law Enforcement, the Department of State, and 
each of the county supervisors of elections.7  In the meantime, local election 
administrators have little real guidance on voter eligibility, allowing for a po-
tential of “67 supervisors of election interpreting” the law in different ways.8 
Much of the debate and discussion surrounding felon disenfranchisement 
and reenfranchisement centers on the constitutionality of disenfranchisement 
or the passage of reform bills.  Yet, as the example of Florida suggests, a major 
obstacle to rights restoration is administrative in nature.  In most states, only a 
modest number of citizens achieve de facto restoration of rights because the 
procedures governing reenfranchisement are confusing and the burden of pur-
suing restoration falls on the citizen.9  The lack of attention to administration 
of restoration policy is concerning because it provides little insight into the 
factors that determine whether citizens’ votes are restored in practice.10   
Despite the fact that most administrators operate in relative obscurity, 
their actions and decisions play a critical role in politics; the vast majority of 
conflict between governments and citizens tends to take place in the adminis-
trative, rather than public, political arena.11   
  
 5. Lawrence Mower, Ron DeSantis Signs Amendment 4 Bill, Limiting Felon Vot-
ing, TAMPA BAY TIMES (June 28, 2019), https://www.tampabay.com/florida-poli-
tics/buzz/2019/06/28/ron-desantis-signs-amendment-4-bill-limiting-felon-voting/ 
[perma.cc/TG6Z-MAMN]. 
 6. Letter from Ron DeSantis, Governor of Fla., to Laurel Lee, Fla. Sec. of State, 
On Senate Bill 7066 (June 28, 2019), https://www.flgov.com/wp-content/up-
loads/2019/06/6.282.pdf [perma.cc/9KLU-GRUZ]. 
 7. Rivero, supra note 4. 
 8. Daniel Rivero, Is Florida’s Amendment Restoring Felons’ Voting Rights 
“Self-Executing”?, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Dec. 30, 2018), 
https://www.npr.org/2018/12/30/680994515/is-floridas-amendment-restoring-felons-
voting-rights-self-executing [perma.cc/Z6DY-CQU2]. 
 9. Marc Mauer & Tushar Kansal, Barred for Life: Voting Rights Restoration in 




 10. See Thessalia Merivaki, Access Denied?  Investigating Voter Registration Re-
jections in Florida, 19 ST. POL. & POL’Y 53, 54 (2019) (noting that existing work on 
election administration has only just begun to understand the dynamics of voter regis-
tration processing). 
 11. Lael R. Keiser & Joe Soss, With Good Cause: Bureaucratic Discretion and 
the Politics of Child Support, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1133, 1133 (Oct. 1988); Michael 
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To use a legal metaphor, citizens who interact with the state to access their 
rights find themselves in an administrative courtroom.  In some cases, they are 
given the presumption of innocence, and little is required of them.  “But in 
other cases, the citizen is treated with suspicion and must prove their [sic] in-
nocence by negotiating a demanding set of administrative burdens.”12 
Sweeping policy change without knowledge of the administrative hurdles 
imposed brings implementation risks, particularly in election administration 
where authority is decentralized and administrators have substantial discretion 
and limited resources.13 
In order to help make sense of how the administration of voting rights 
restoration reforms influence citizens’ civil rights, this Article utilizes the con-
cept of administrative burden.  Put simply, administrative burden consists of 
the learning, compliance, and psychological costs citizens experience when in-
teracting with government.14  These costs make a difference in citizens lives, 
affect some groups more than others, and often reinforce inequities in society.15  
Furthermore, they are the product of deliberate choices made in the political 
arena.16 
Administrative burden is particularly relevant when citizens exercise their 
democratic rights through voting.17  When election administrators struggle to 
implement policy, often without any real guidance from their principals in the 
legislative or executive branches, they must make decisions about how much 
burden to absorb and what costs to pass on to citizens.  Financial resources, 
expertise, and organizations within which administrators operate affect these 
decisions.  With respect to the restoration of voting rights for citizens with fel-
ony convictions, there is limited administrative capacity to absorb the costs of 
policy implementation.  Furthermore, even in the unlikely event that all admin-
istrators operate under the same conditions, individual experiences with the 
government condition the effects of policy change.  Rights restoration requires 
that citizens have accurate information about eligibility, have the ability to al-
locate resources for compliance with eligibility requirements, and are able to 
overcome the frustration, stress, and sense of helplessness that often results 
from government interaction.  These burdens often impede restoration reform. 
  
Lipsky, Bureaucratic Disentitlement in Social Welfare Programs, 58 SOC. SERV. REV. 
3, 5 (Mar. 1984). 
 12. Donald Moynihan & Pamela Herd, Red Tape and Democracy: How Rules Af-
fect Citizenship Rights, 40 AM. R. PUB. ADMIN. 654, 658 (2010). 
 13. See Barry C. Burden, David T. Canon, Kenneth R. Mayer & Donald P. Moyni-
han, Early Voting and Election Day Registration in the Trenches: Local Officials’ Per-
ceptions of Election Reform, 10 ELECTION L.J. 89, 89 (2011). 
 14. PAMELA HERD & DONALD P. MOYNIHAN, ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN: 
POLICYMAKING BY OTHER MEANS 22 (2018) 
 15. Id. at 3. 
 16. Id.  
 17. Donald Moynihan, Pamela Herd & Hope Harvey, Administrative Burden: 
Learning, Psychological, and Compliance Costs in Citizen-State Interactions, 25 J. 
PUB. ADMIN. RES. THEORY 43, 45 (2014). 
4
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 84, Iss. 4 [], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol84/iss4/6
2019] VOTING RIGHTS 1003 
In Part I, this Article examines election administration in the context of 
public administration.   Part I argues that, too often, policymakers and scholars 
conflate laws with the government’s administration of and citizen experience 
with those laws.  This is particularly true in the area of felon disenfranchise-
ment and citizen rights restoration.  The combination of decentralization and 
discretion in the American electoral system means that the implementation of 
policies designed to restore citizens’ rights likely varies across jurisdictions. 
Part II applies the concept of administrative burden to explain this varia-
tion.  After defining the concept of administrative burden and making some 
assumptions about the policy process, Part II discusses the effect of adminis-
trative capacity and citizen experience on policy implementation.  The context 
in which administrators operate and citizens’ ability to advocate for their civil 
rights have consequences for the effectiveness of any legal regime of voting 
rights restoration.  As a result, even in the face of de jure rights restoration, 
policymakers can alter de facto restoration with seemingly apolitical statutory 
language. 
Throughout Parts I and II, this Article discusses the application of a single 
legal framework across a range of jurisdictions but uses the example of Flor-
ida’s Amendment 4 to illustrate key points.  Part III explores more explicitly 
Amendment 4’s implementing legislation and addresses the administrative 
complications that arise from the legislation.  In doing so, that Part identifies 
concerns about administrative capacity and discusses individuals’ likely expe-
riences with the administration of that legislation.  Finally, Part III identifies 
the political context in which administrators implement Florida’s rights resto-
ration policy and speculates on the likelihood of legislative, administrative, or 
judicial recourse.   
I.  ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AS PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 
Public administration contemplates the relationship between administra-
tors, political leaders, and citizens in the pursuit of sound governance.18  Poli-
cymakers and citizens alike understand that government agencies play a key 
role in informing, guiding, and even coercing citizen behavior consistent with 
community goals.19  In the context of elections, examples of how government 
agencies shape citizen behavior abound.  For example, the Federal Election 
Commission administers and formulates policy with respect to campaign fi-
nance law,20 the U.S. Election Assistance Commission exists to develop guid-
ance on federal statutory requirements relating to voting systems and voter 
  
 18. James H. Svara, The Myth of the Dichotomy: Complementarity of Politics and 
Administration in the Past and Future of Public Administration, 61 PUB. ADMIN. R. 
176, 179 (2001). 
 19. BRIAN J. COOK, BUREAUCRACY AND SELF GOVERNMENT: RECONSIDERING THE 
ROLE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 11 (2d ed. 2014). 
 20. 52 U.S.C. § 30106(b)(1) (2018). 
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access,21 each state has a chief election official or board that administers elec-
tion law,22 and local governments delegate to specific officials the authority to 
register voters and administer elections.23  These examples suggest that “[e]lec-
tion administration is public administration.”24   
Those who consider public administration in the law tend to focus on the 
external or statutory factors that govern the relationship between administrators 
and citizens.25  Rich debate over statutory language and well-developed theo-
ries of judicial statutory interpretation are hallmarks of legal discussions on the 
subject.26  However, how administrative agencies interpret their statutory man-
dates and implement policy in their day-to-day operations receives compara-
tively less attention.27  This is problematic, as internal agency procedures and 
practices are the most powerful determinants of administrative action.28   
Nowhere is this truer than in election administration.  Policymakers and 
scholars alike focus less on understanding and improving the relationship be-
tween the administrative process and citizen participation in elections and more 
on the statutory and constitutional language designed to structure the dy-
namic.29  Certainly, the legal framework that governs our electoral process is 
of tremendous importance.  However, in the context of election administration 
generally and in citizen rights restoration specifically, it is all too common for 
policymakers and scholars to conflate laws with government implementation 
  
 21. 52 U.S.C. § 20922 (2018). 
 22. KAREN L. SHANTON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45549, THE STATE AND LOCAL 
ROLE IN ELECTION ADMINISTRATION: DUTIES AND STRUCTURES 12–13 (Mar. 4, 2019), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45549.pdf [perma.cc/8WFN-95WL]. 
 23. See Election Administration at State and Local Levels, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. 
LEGIS. (June 15, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/elec-
tion-administration-at-state-and-local-levels.aspx [perma.cc/JQ4J-3QJM]. 
 24. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N ON ELECTION ADMIN., THE AMERICAN VOTING 
EXPERIENCE: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON 
ELECTION ADMINISTRATION 18 (2014), https://www.eac.gov/assets/1/6/Amer-Voting-
Exper-final-draft-01-09-14-508.pdf [perma.cc/R5KJ-EP63]. 
 25. Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law, Public Administration, and the Ad-
ministrative Conference of the United States, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1517, 1518 
(2015). 
 26. See Kevin M. Stack, Purposivism in the Executive Branch: How Agencies In-
terpret Statutes, 109 NW. U.L. REV. 871, 874 (2015). 
 27. Metzger, supra note 25, at 1520–21; Stack, supra note 27, at 874.   
 28. JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE 
LOST ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 313 (2012). 
 29. R. Michael Alvarez & Thad E. Hall, Controlling Democracy: The Principal-
Agent Problems in Election Administration, 34 POL. STUD. J. 491, 492 (2006); but see 
Charles R. Wise, Election Administration in Crisis: An Early Look at Lessons from 
Bush versus Gore, 61 PUB. ADMIN. R. 131, 137 (2001) 
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of and citizen experience with those laws.30  This leads to a persistent lack of 
attention to the actual (not hypothesized) implications of the law31 and puzzling 
management of our electoral system.  As a result, it remains true that “[t]here 
is probably no other phase of public administration in the United States which 
is so badly managed as the conduct of elections.”32  
Part of this is by design – uniformity and management were not funda-
mental considerations in modeling American electoral institutions.33  Instead, 
a commitment to geographically based representation is the hallmark of Amer-
ican elections.34  The decentralized process provided by the Elections Clause 
of the U.S. Constitution ensures that the regulation and administration of elec-
tions occur primarily at the state level.35  This means the legal framework gov-
erning both federal and state elections varies across the country, as states ad-
minister and apportion responsibility between state and local governments in 
different ways.36  Indeed, officials in approximately 8,000 different jurisdic-
tions are responsible for administering American elections.37  This incredible 
variation not only makes governing the electoral process complex but also has 
implications for how administrators implement and citizens experience that 
framework.  Thus, any discussion of citizen rights restoration policy must in-
clude serious consideration of administration in addition to statutory text.   
In order to understand the implications of public administration for rights 
restoration policy, this Article assumes that any legal framework governing the 
restoration of voting rights for citizens who have a felony conviction applies 
uniformly across all jurisdictions.  For example, the mandate of Florida’s 
  
 30. See Barry C. Burden, David T. Canon, Kenneth R. Mayer & Donald P. Moyni-
han, The Effect of Administrative Burden on Bureaucratic Perception of Policies: Evi-
dence from Election Administration, 72 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 741, 742 (2012). 
 31. Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to 
Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1476 (1998). 
 32. JOSEPH P. HARRIS, ELECTION ADMINISTRATION IN THE UNITED STATES 1 
(1934). 
 33. ALEC C. EWALD, THE WAY WE VOTE: THE LOCAL DIMENSIONS OF AMERICAN 
SUFFRAGE 11, 105 (2009) 
 34. Id. 
 35. U.S. CONST. art. 1 § 4 (“The Times, Places, and Manner of holding Elections 
for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the legislature 
thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, 
except as to the Places of chusing Senators”); see also Daniel P. Tokaji, The Future of 
Election Reform: From Rules to Institutions, 28 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 125, 127 
(2009). 
 36. Justin Weinstein-Tull, Election Law Federalism, 114 MICH. L. REV. 747, 752–
53 (2016). 
 37. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N ON ELECTION ADMIN., supra note 24, at 1.  Kimball 
and Baybeck find the exact number of localities is 7,858.  David C. Kimball & Brady 
Baybeck, Are All Jurisdictions Equal? Size Disparity in Election Administration, 12 
ELECTION L.J. 130, 131 (2013) (but noting that just 462 jurisdictions serve more than 
two-thirds of all American voters). 
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Amendment 4 applies equally to all citizens in the state.38  However, despite 
the claims of some, such legal mandates are not “self-executing.”39  This means 
that there is variation in the implementation of the legal framework.  State ad-
ministrators must implement the mandate when interacting with citizens but 
often do so in different ways.   In the case of Amendment 4, while statutory 
law guides administrators in their interactions with citizens who seek to register 
to vote, for a variety of reasons, those administrators may not implement the 
law in a uniform manner.  
Two aspects of election administration are particularly relevant when 
thinking about how administrators implement legal mandates.  First, the decen-
tralized nature of our electoral process means that, even when faced with the 
same statutory text, efforts to restore citizens’ rights will likely vary across ju-
risdictions.  Second, the amount of discretion built into election administration 
results in potential for differential implementation of the law. 
A.  Decentralization in Election Administration 
The number of state and local jurisdictions that have authority over elec-
tions has led many to refer to election administration as “hyperfederalized.”40  
While the federal government does have power to regulate elections, state del-
egation constitutes the vast majority of election law and policy.41  Most states 
vest a majority of election administration in local officials and retain some for-
mal role for election oversight at the state level.42  In addition to the allotment 
of authority from the federal to the state and local level, fragmentation also 
occurs across and within units.43  State involvement in overseeing election ad-
ministration differs across the country, and there is much variation in admin-
istration at the sub-state level.44  Thus, the American electoral system is one 
that is classified by both vertical and horizontal decentralization.45 
  
 38. FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4. 
 39. E.g., Patricia Mazzei, Florida Felons Once Denied Rights Begin Registering 
to Vote, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2019) https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/08/us/florida-fel-
ons-voting-rights.html [perma.cc/27P4-WDFN]; Press Release, ACLU of Fla., State-
ment on Senate Bill Restricting Amendment 4 (Mar. 25, 2019), 
https://www.aclufl.org/en/press-releases/aclu-florida-statement-senate-bill-restricting-
amendment-4 [perma.cc/6JJR-89VL].  
 40. E.g., EWALD, supra note 33, at 3 (2009); Richard L. Hasen, Beyond the Margin 
of Litigation: Reforming U.S. Election Administration to Avoid Electoral Meltdown, 62 
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 937, 952 (2005). 
 41. Weinstein-Tull, supra note 36, at 753. 
 42. Id. at 779–80. 
 43. SHANTON, supra note 22, at 2. 
 44. Note, Toward a Greater State Role in Election Administration, 118 HARV. L. 
REV. 2314, 2324 (2005). 
 45. Robert S. Montjoy, The Public Administration of Elections, 68 PUB. ADMIN. 
REV. 788, 789 (2008). 
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This decentralization affects the uniformity of the American electoral pro-
cess and the capacity of governmental units to administer elections.46  In a 
highly decentralized system, understanding the state and local factors that in-
fluence administration is essential.47  With respect to felon disenfranchisement 
and reenfranchisement, this means one must examine closely whether admin-
istrators implement rules uniformly.  If the factors that shape implementation 
vary across or within units, then the way administrators apply the law neces-
sarily will differ depending upon locale as well.48  The way administrators re-
move and restore citizens’ rights will likely differ based upon organizational 
and other structural environments, even in the presence of a uniform set of 
standards.49  For example, in her 2002-2003 interviews with county election 
boards, Professor Jessie Allen found that about half of New York counties re-
quired documentary proof of eligibility for citizens with felony convictions to 
register to vote despite there being no legal mandate for such documentation.50  
Even when the New York State Board of Elections attempted to impose uni-
formity by issuing a memo to all county commissioners, differences in county 
practices remained.51  Little follow up by the State Board regarding policy im-
plementation after the initial memo, combined with tremendous variation in 
commissioners’ abilities to change routinized practices, resulted in many 
county commissioners continuing to operate as they did before the State 
Board’s attempts at clarification.  
B. Election Administrators’ Discretion  
Part of the variation in election administration results from the discretion 
granted to administrators.  When regulating elections, the legislature inevitably 
delegates authority to election administrators and specifies the duties of differ-
ent public officials.  As discussed above, states vary with respect to the amount 
of discretion legislators delegate to administrators.52  Yet any delegation of 
  
 46. Id.  
 47. Merivaki, supra note 10, at 54. 
 48. See Keiser & Soss, supra note 11, at 1134. 
 49. See e.g., Beth A. Colgan, Wealth-Based Penal Disenfranchisement, 72 VAND. 
L. REV. 57, 69 (2019); Comment, Block the Vote: How a New Wave of State Election 
Laws is Rolling Unevenly Over Voters and the Dilemma of How to Prevent It, 43 CUMB. 
L. REV. 95, 96 (2012). 
 50. Jessie Allen, Documentary Disenfranchisement, 86 TUL. L. REV. 389, 417 
(2011). 
 51. Id. at 419–20. 
 52. Jocelyn Friedrichs Benson, Democracy and the Secretary: The Crucial Role 
of State Election Administrators in Promoting Accuracy and Access to Democracy, 27 
ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 343, 356 (2008); Jocelyn Friedrichs Benson, One Person, 
One Vote: Protecting Access to Franchise through the Effective Administration of Elec-
tion Procedures and Protections, 40 URB. LAW. 269, 270–73 (2008). 
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power grants some measure of discretion,53 and even the relatively specific 
statutes that voting rights advocates view as accommodating can add proce-
dural complications to administration.54   
Interpretation and implementation of the law is inevitably a nuanced en-
deavor over which reasonable administrators can disagree.55  While the legal 
restrictions placed on administrators by the Constitution, federal statutes, state 
constitutions, state legislators, and federal and state judges set the boundaries 
within which administrators operate, local administrators likely interpret and 
implement those policies in different ways.56  This is particularly true with re-
spect to voter eligibility, where the law is especially complex.  Many states fail 
to develop administrative guidelines, and those that do often produce compli-
cated, confusing, or conflicting procedures.57   
Furthermore, felon disenfranchisement and rights restoration policies 
tend to be couched in vague language and involve far more administrative dis-
cretion than simple voter registration.58 
As noted by Professor Beth Colgan, 
[P]enal disenfranchisement and reenfranchisement practices are 
not neatly laid out in a discrete set of statutes . . . Ascertaining what 
[restoration processes] are involves an analysis of multiple layers 
of constitutional and statutory text, administrative rules, and depart-
mental policies, and necessitates an understanding of not just voter 
registration procedures but also the intricacies of each jurisdiction’s 
clemency, parole, and probation systems.59 
  
 53. Note, Toward a Greater State Role in Election Administration, supra note 44, 
at 2316; see also Terry M. Moe & Scott A. Wilson, Presidents and the Politics of Struc-
ture, 57 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 23 (1994) (arguing that a proliferation in statutes 
afford executives substantial discretion as they coordinate policy and resolve conflicts). 
 54. Ben F. C. Wallace, Charting Procedural Due Process and the Fundamental 
Right to Vote, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 647, 649 (2016). 
 55. Tokaji, supra note 35, at 133. 
 56. David C. Kimball & Martha Kropf, The Street-Level Bureaucrats of Elections: 
Selection Methods for Local Election Officials, 23 REV. POL’Y RES. 1257, 1257–58 
(2006); see also Donald P. Moynihan & Carol L. Silva, The Administrators of Democ-
racy: A Research Note on Local Election Officials, 68 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 816, 824 
(2008) (noting that federal reform mandates not only make local election administration 
more complex, but also more scrutinized and constrained). 
 57. See EWALD, supra note 33, at 139. 
 58. JEFF MANZA & CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, LOCKED OUT: FELON 
DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 83 (2006); Friedrichs Benson, su-
pra note 52, at 372; Cherish M. Keller, Re-Enfranchisement Laws Provide Unequal 
Treatment: Ex-Felon Re-Enfranchisement and the Fourteenth Amendment, 81 CHI-
KENT L. REV. 199, 225 (2006). 
 59. Colgan, supra note 49, at 65–66; see also Erika Wood & Rachel Bloom, De 
Facto Disenfranchisement, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. 8–9 (2008), 
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Evidence suggests that administrators struggle to navigate these legal lay-
ers.  In interviews with local administrators in ten states, Professor Alec Ewald 
found that more than a third of administrators in those states either were igno-
rant of or confused about their states’ eligibility laws.60  This confusion has real 
consequences.  For example, in the 2000 elections, even the state of Florida’s 
attempt to enforce its then constitutional mandate to disenfranchise citizens 
with a felony conviction was riddled with error.61  With respect to rights resto-
ration, administrative discretion and confusion tends to result in more exclu-
sionary policies than legally required.62   
II.  ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN AND THE COSTS OF VOTING RIGHTS 
RESTORATION 
As suggested in the previous section, the American federalist system of 
elections and the resulting administrative discretion affect the implementation 
of disenfranchisement and reenfranchisement laws.  Even operating under the 
exact same legal mandate, election administrators’ actions may vary as a result 
of a complex interaction of factors.63  The decentralized and autonomous li-
cense under which election administrators operate tends to exacerbate the prob-
lem and may prevent citizens from voting rights restoration.64  While the vari-
ation in election administration can seem random or unpredictable at first 
glance, the concept of administrative burden can help explain how administra-
tors implement policy and why even statutes with the most generous rights res-
toration language may not result in de facto reenfranchisement.65   
Administrative burden consists of the costs an individual might experi-
ence in her interactions with government.66  The consideration of 
  
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/publica-
tions/09.08.DeFacto.Disenfranchisement.pdf [perma.cc/8NW8-AUT9] (suggesting 
that laws are difficult to understand and require expertise in multiple fields). 
 60. EWALD, supra note 33, at 141. 
 61. Guy Stuart, Databases, Felons, and Voting: Bias and Partisanship of the Flor-
ida Felons List in the 2000 Elections, 119 POL. SCI. Q. 453, 474 (2004).  These errors 
were the result of, inter alia, data quality problems and variation in local election su-
pervisor administration. Id. at 461.  The distribution of these errors was highest in high-
purge Republican counties. Id. at 474.   
 62. EWALD, supra note 33, at 140. 
 63. See Evelyn Z. Brodkin, Inside the Welfare Contract: Discretion and Account-
ability in State Welfare Administration, 71 SOC. SERV. REV. 1, 4 (1997); Patrick G. 
Scott, Assessing Determinants of Bureaucratic Discretion: An Experiment in Street-
Level Decision Making, 7 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. THEORY 35, 37–39 (1997). 
 64. See Allen, supra note 50, at 424; Melissa C. Chiang, Some Kind of Process for 
Felon Disenfranchisement, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1331, 1353 (2005). 
 65. See MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE 
INDIVIDUAL IN PUBLIC SERVICE 3 (1980); Burden et al., supra note 30, at 749.   
 66. HERD & MOYNIHAN, supra note 14, at 22. 
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administrative burden begins with a few relatively uncontroversial assump-
tions.  First, most can agree that citizens are better off when administrators 
implement policy in a fair, accessible, and respectful manner.  However, all 
interactions between citizens and government generate some costs.67  Govern-
ment actors must invest time, financial resources, and energy in making and 
implementing policy.68  Likewise, citizens invest time, financial resources, and 
effort into complying with government policy.69  When acting in their capacity, 
public officials seek to minimize these costs while protecting important public 
values.70  For example, in election administration, public officials often balance 
the need for accessibility, dependability, and security against the financial and 
political cost of doing so.71 
Aspects of both government and its citizens affect these costs, or admin-
istrative burdens.  Relative to other policies, policies that enable citizen partic-
ipation or are targeted at specific groups are more likely to generate costs as 
administrators devote time and resources to implementation.72  Additionally, 
because citizens’ resources vary, administrative burdens affect some groups 
more than others.73  This is particularly true with respect to election administra-
tion and rights restoration policy.74  Yet, citizens are comparatively unaware of 
the effects of administration in this context.  As a result, policymakers can and 
do adjust administrative burden to achieve political objectives. 
A.  Administrative Capacity and Policy Implementation Costs 
Policy implementation is generally a repetitive and onerous process.  
Structural factors related to the organizations that implement policy influence 
  
 67. Id. at 21; Burden, et al., supra note 30, at 741. 
 68. Burden, et al., supra note 30, at 742. 
 69. Id.  
 70. HERD & MOYNIHAN, supra note 14, at 13. 
 71. E.g., H.R. Res. 1, 116th Cong. (2019); CONG. BUDGET OFF., COST ESTIMATE, 
H.R. 1, FOR THE PEOPLE ACT OF 2019 (2019), https://www.cbo.gov/publication/55003 
[perma.cc/5JEN-ZC45]; Brian Pascus, House Passes H.R. 1, A Sweeping Anti-Corrup-
tion and Voting Rights Bill, CBSNEWS (March 8, 2019), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/house-passes-hr-1-sweeping-anti-corruption-and-vot-
ing-rights-legislation-today-2019-03-08/ [perma.cc/CBW8-A6HP]. 
 72. HERD & MOYNIHAN, supra note 14, at 21; Burden et al., supra note 30, at 742; 
Donald P. Moynihan, Normative and Instrumental Perspectives on Public Participa-
tion: Citizen Summits in Washington, D.C., 33 AM. R. PUB. ADMIN. 164, 165 (2003). 
 73. HERD & MOYNIHAN, supra note 14, at 13. 
 74. See, e.g., EWALD, supra note 33, at 146 (reasoning that variation in policy im-
plementation leads to practical disenfranchisement); RONALD HAYDUK, GATEKEEPERS 
TO THE FRANCHISE, SHAPING ELECTION ADMINISTRATION IN NEW YORK 7 (2005) (ar-
guing that practical disenfranchisement occurs for those who have the greatest diffi-
culty in overcoming disparate election practices and technology (low-income citizens, 
first-time voters, minority populations, etc.)); Allen, supra note 50, at 430–31 (discuss-
ing how administrative costs impose different levels of disenfranchisement). 
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this implementation.75  As election administrators perform their jobs, these ad-
ministrators face competing factors that influence how they make decisions.76  
Because election administrators rarely operate in a centralized organization, 
under clear decision rules, or with effective training, they vary in their imple-
mentation of the law and interaction with citizens.77  For example, local juris-
dictions repeatedly and consistently report administrative challenges in regis-
tering voters, and these challenges – exacerbated by the tremendous variation 
in jurisdictional resources and composition78 – make it hard to ensure uniform 
implementation of enfranchisement.79   
This means that considerations of rights restoration policy are compli-
cated by the fact that even if reenfranchisement is legally possible, administra-
tive capacity may prevent effective administration.80  As utilized in this Article, 
the concept of administrative capacity is simply the ability of administrators to 
perform the tasks the law and political principals assign to them.81  When en-
acting legislation to restore voting rights to citizens with felony convictions, 
lawmakers should consider three aspects of administrative capacity: financial 
resources, administrative expertise, and organizational structure. 
1.  Financial Resources 
First, financial resources affect an administrative agency’s ability to take 
on administrative burden and to shift the costs of policy implementation from 
  
 75. Evelyn Z. Brodkin & Malay Majmunder, Administrative Exclusion: Organi-
zations and the Hidden Costs of Welfare Claiming, 20 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. THEORY 
827, 828–29 (2010); Burden et al., supra note 30, at 742; see also Joe Soss, Richard 
Fording & Sanford F. Schram, The Organization of Discipline: From Performance 
Management to Perversity and Punishment, 21 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. THEORY 203, 205–
06 (finding that performance management pressures affect how decentralized case 
managers interact with their clients). 
 76. See Keiser & Soss, supra note 11, at 1152; Soss et al., supra note 75, at 219. 
 77. See R. Michael Alvarez & Thad E. Hall, Building Secure and Transparent 
Elections through Standard Operating Procedures, 68 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 828, 830 
(2008). 
 78. Compare, for example, the City of Los Angeles to a town in Missouri with 500 
residents. 
 79. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., VIEWS OF SELECTED LOCAL ELECTION 
OFFICIALS ON MANAGING VOTER REGISTRATION AND ENSURING ELIGIBLE CITIZENS 
CAN VOTE 11, 16 (2005), https://www.gao.gov/assets/250/247944.pdf 
[perma.cc/L36Y-UHG8]; Kimball & Baybeck, supra note 37, at 141; Merivaki, supra 
note 10, at 71; Tokaji, supra note 35, at 130–31. 
 80. Ann Cammett, Shadow Citizens: Felony Disenfranchisement and the Crimi-
nalization of Debt, 117 PENN. ST. L. REV. 349, 376 (2012). 
 81. See John J. Gargan, Consideration of Local Government Capacity, 41 PUB. 
ADMIN. R. 649, 651–52 (1981). 
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citizens.82  Research demonstrates that the resources provided to the adminis-
trators who interact most often with citizens are often inadequate and only be-
come more deficient as demands for administrators’ services increase over 
time.83  This is certainly true in election administration, where the most univer-
sal complaint from those on the front-lines concerns a lack of resources.84   
Furthermore, like with most other aspects of elections, federalism and the 
complexity of the electoral process make it very difficult to determine the fi-
nancial cost of voter education and registration, election regulation and legis-
lation, and results certification.  As put by researchers at the National Confer-
ence of State Legislators, “No one knows how much it costs to run elections in 
the United States.”85  The total cost is likely astronomical.  For example, in 
2018, Congress approved $380 million in grants simply for states to improve 
election security – administrators referred to the money as a “a 10-cent solution 
to a $25 problem.”86  
Like with most other aspects of election administration, states fund their 
electoral systems differently.  In some states, local governments bear the entire 
financial burden of election administration, and in others, state governments 
reimburse localities for electoral costs.87  As an increasing number of state and 
local governments face financial crises, election administration often suffers;88 
when public officials face fiscal pressure, election administration does not rank 
  
 82. HERD & MOYNIHAN, supra note 14, at 31; see also Bryan D. Jones, Saadia R. 
Greenberg, Clifford Kaufman & Joseph Drew, Bureaucratic Response to Citizen-Initi-
ated Contacts: Environmental Enforcement in Detroit, 71 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 148, 164 
(1977) (ability of administrators to process claims is inversely related to number of 
clients and social well-being). 
 83. LIPSKY, supra note 65, at 27. 
 84. Robert S. Montjoy, The Changing Nature . . . and Costs . . . of Election Ad-
ministration, 70 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 867, 868 (2010). 
 85. Katy Owens Hubler & Wendy Underhill, Election Costs: Who Pays and With 
Which Funds?, 26 LEGISBRIEF 1 (2018), 
http://www.ncsl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=y7G5AApY0KI%3d&tabid=32195&p
ortalid=1 [perma.cc/CCK9-8CUY]. 
 86. Ashley Lopez, Local Officials Call Federal Election Funds “A 10-Cent Solu-
tion to a $25 Problem”, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Aug. 4, 2018), 
https://www.npr.org/2018/08/04/634707340/local-officials-call-federal-election-
funds-a-10-cent-solution-to-a-25-problem [perma.cc/9GZB-ZK74]. 
 87. SHANTON, supra note 22, at 9–11; Note, Toward a Greater State Role in Elec-
tion Administration, supra note 44, at 2324–25.   
 88. Montjoy, supra note 84, at 868. 
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high on the priority list.89  Furthermore, the allocation of those resources that 
public officials do have tends to be influenced by political factors.90 
This means that most states and localities are not well situated financially 
to administer rights restoration.91  For example, in its assessment of the finan-
cial impact of Florida's Amendment 4, the Office of Economic and Demo-
graphic Research – the research agency of the Florida state legislature – found 
that the Amendment would result in increased costs to local governments, to 
the Florida Departments of State and Corrections, and to state circuit courts.92  
Even if one accounted for revenues obtained by requiring citizen payments of 
court-ordered restitution, fines, and court costs before voter registration, state 
and local governments would still need significant additional financial re-
sources in order to implement restoration policy; “Florida has no system to 
track restitution, and creating one could cost millions of dollars.”93   
2.  Administrative Expertise 
In addition to financial resources, administrative expertise affects capac-
ity.  Administrators develop skills and knowledge, which, when granted 
  
 89. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N ON ELECTION ADMIN., THE AMERICAN VOTING 
EXPERIENCE: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON 
ELECTION ADMINISTRATION 10 (2014), https://www.eac.gov/assets/1/6/Amer-Voting-
Exper-final-draft-01-09-14-508.pdf [perma.cc/AWG3-PLHA]. 
 90. Zachary Mohr, JoEllen V. Pope, Martha E. Kropf & Mary Jo Shepherd, Stra-
tegic Spending: Does Politics Influence Election Administration Expenditure, 63 AM. 
J. POL. SCI. 427, 434 (2019). 
 91. MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 58, at 90. 
 92. STATE OF FLA., OFFICE OF ECON. & DEMOGRAPHIC RESEARCH, FIN. IMPACT 
ESTIMATING CONF., COMPLETE INITIATIVE FINANCIAL INFORMATION STATEMENT 
VOTING RESTORATION AMENDMENT (2016), http://edr.state.fl.us/Content/constitu-
tional-amendments/2018Ballot/VRA_Report.pdf [perma.cc/S4DY-5ZZR]; see also 
Mike Schneider, Official Tells Florida Democrats to Expect Recount in 2020, ASS’N 
PRESS (June 8, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/official-tells-florida-
democrats-to-expect-recount-in-2020/2019/06/08/91d0b66a-8a16-11e9-9d73-
e2ba6bbf1b9b_story.html?utm_term=.704c8b14bbc6 [perma.cc/4YK7-7LPN] (Flor-
ida Democrats hope to employ 15,000 lawyers and volunteers around the state to help 
monitor election administration); c.f. Marl Schlakman, Walt McNeil, & Ion Sancho, 
Here’s What You Haven’t Heard About Restoring Ex-Felon’s Voting Rights, ORLANDO 
SENTINEL (Oct. 8, 2018), https://www.orlandosentinel.com/opinion/os-op-felon-rights-
restoration-florida-analysis-20181009-story.html [perma.cc/6CT7-P7V2] (suggesting 
that, during the 1970s, Governor Reubin Askew’s restoration regime reduced costs to 
taxpayers). 
 93. Lawrence Mower & Emily L. Mahoney, House Passes Amendment 4 Bill Re-
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discretion in policy implementation, they can use to make decisions.94  This 
notion of expertise is inherent when it comes to almost every aspect of admin-
istrative action – from decisions about whether or not (and how) to regulate, an 
agency’s creation of procedures, and an agency’s interpretation of its own pol-
icy.95 
However, administrative expertise is complex and multifaceted.96  Due to 
a wide array of individual and institutional factors, administrators vary in their 
acquisition of subject-matter and institutional knowledge.97  Expertise is costly 
to acquire, and even those administrators who serve in their agencies for long 
periods of time may only obtain experience with routines, as opposed to gain-
ing policy skills.98  Administrators who lack institutional and policy knowledge 
may shift the cost of implementation to citizens.  Furthermore, those adminis-
trators who acquire policy expertise may use their knowledge to administer 
policy in a way that differs from the preferences of the legislature or the pub-
lic.99   
A consistent problem in election administration is that many administra-
tors (a) lack the expertise to understand fully their states’ electoral laws and 
regulations and (b) are incapable of navigating the labyrinth of administrative 
organizations involved in any one policy.100  Election administrators have little 
  
 94. See Generally ANTHONY DOWNS, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY (1967).   
 95. E.g., Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1207 (2015); Decker 
v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 612–14 (2013); Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 
461–63 (1997); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
865 (1984); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 435 
U.S. 519, 544–45 (1978). 
 96. Sidney A. Shapiro, The Failure to Understand Expertise in Administrative 
Law: The Problem and the Consequences, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1097, 1105 
(2015). 
 97. E.g. Sean Gailmard & John W. Patty, Slackers and Zealots: Civil Service, Pol-
icy Discretion, and Bureaucratic Expertise, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 873, 876 (2007); Mat-
thew C. Stephenson, Information Acquisition and Institutional Design, 124 HARV. L. 
REV. 1422, 1426 (2011). 
 98. James O. Freedman, Expertise and the Administrative Process, 28 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 363, 371 (1976).   
 99. E.g., D. RODERICK KIEWIET AND MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE LOGIC OF 
DELEGATION: CONGRESSIONAL PARTIES AND THE APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS (1991); 
Francis E. Rourke, Variations in Agency Power, in BUREAUCRATIC POWER IN 
NATIONAL POLITICS (Francis E. Rourke ed., 1976).  Administrators who have more ex-
perience can use their skills to overcome or increase burden. HERD & MOYNIHAN, supra 
note 14, at 32. 
 100. Marc Meredith & Michael Morse, The Politics of the Restoration of Ex-Felon 
Voting Rights: The Case of Iowa, 10 Q.J. POL. SCI. 41, 43 (2015); Alec Ewald, A 
“Crazy-Quilt” of Tiny Pieces: State and Local Administration of American Criminal 
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training or access to educational material and face confusing and contradictory 
laws and policies.101  In their discussions with about 100 election administra-
tors, Professors Kathleen Hale, Robert Montjoy, and Mitchell Brown found 
that an increase in professionalism, a decrease in the number of organizational 
layers involved in elections, and more streamlined procedures would signifi-
cantly improve the elections administration landscape.102  This is particularly 
true in the area of felon disenfranchisement and reenfranchisement as scholars, 
citizens, and administrative officials alike puzzle over the parameters of rights 
restoration.103   
3.  Organizational Structure 
Finally, organizational differences influence administrative capacity.  Be-
cause agencies are organized to address specific problems, their structures and 
processes shape policy implementation by prioritizing and organizing admin-
istrative action.104  Over time, these organizational schemes can generate a cul-
ture that recognizes some tasks as more important than others and can enhance 
administrators’ autonomy in performing those tasks.105   
Adding a new policy mandate to an agency’s mix of responsibilities 
makes administrators’ tasks more complex.106  It can become difficult, if not 
impossible, for administrators to follow all laws and policies in their entirety.107  
While statutory law may occasionally provide guidance, most agencies have 




 101. MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 58, at 89; Erika Wood, Restoring the Right to 
Vote, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. 14 (2d ed. 2009), https://www.brennan-
center.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Democracy/Restor-
ing%20the%20Right%20to%20Vote.pdf [perma.cc/X2MK-FMZZ]; Wood & Bloom, 
supra note 59, at 1–6. 
 102. KATHLEEN HALE, ROBERT MONTJOY & MITCHELL BROWN, ADMINISTERING 
ELECTIONS: HOW AMERICAN ELECTIONS WORK 144 (2015). 
 103. MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 58, at 84; Christopher Uggen, Angela Behrens 
& Jeff Manza, Criminal Disenfranchisement, 1 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 307, 318 
(2005). 
 104. SAMUEL WORKMAN, THE DYNAMICS OF BUREAUCRACY IN THE U.S. 
GOVERNMENT 38 (2015). 
 105. DANIEL CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY 15–25 
(2001). 
 106. Robert S. Montjoy & Laurence O’Toole, Jr., Toward a Theory of Policy Im-
plementation: An Organizational Perspective, 39 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 465, 465 (1979) 
(noting that new tasks likely compete with old ones). 
 107. Keiser & Soss, supra note 11, at 1138. 
 108. Young Han Chun & Hal G. Rainey, Goal Ambiguity and Organizational Per-
formance in U.S. Federal Agencies, 15 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. THEORY 529, 529 (2005); 
Chan Su Jung, Extending the Theory of Goal Ambiguity to Programs: Examining the 
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administrators’ choices about how to direct their attention becomes a decision 
not just about policy prioritization but also about the areas on which not to 
focus energy.109  In this way, structural factors influence the administration of 
elections.110   
While communication of policy priorities and procedures can alleviate 
some of these concerns, such communication is often lacking in election ad-
ministration.111  Despite the fact that, in most states, the Secretary of State over-
sees, implements, and interprets election directives from all authorities – fed-
eral and state legislative, executive, and judicial – few states have centralized 
procedures for rights restoration.112  This leaves lower level administrators with 
a great deal of discretion and responsibility.113  How administrators act in the 
face of such discretion can be the result of organizational features that affect 
the administrators’ work environments and can lead to variation in how differ-
ent administrators implement the same law.114   
Another organizational consideration is the number of agencies or bu-
reaus involved in implementing a single policy.  Challenges can arise when 
multiple units are involved in administration.  While examples of administra-
tive redundancy abound in the American political system, involving several 
agencies in the same policy can reduce the chances of successful implementa-
tion.115  Like with other aspects of organizational structure, coordination tools 
such as consultation requirements, interagency agreements, and centralized gu-
bernatorial review can help alleviate some of these challenges.116  Yet it is often 
  
Relationship Between Goal Ambiguity and Performance, 74 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 205, 
206 (2014); Hal G. Rainey, A Theory of Goal Ambiguity in Public Organizations, in 
RESEARCH IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, vol. II (J.L. Perry ed., 1993). 
 109. See generally FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER & BRYAN D. JONES, AGENDAS AND 
INSTABILITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1993); see also Amber E. Boydstun, Shaun 
Bevan, & Herschel F. Thomas III, The Importance of Attention Diversity and How to 
Measure It, 42 POL. STUDIES. J. 173, 176 (2014). 
 110. Note, Toward a Greater State Role in Election Administration, supra note 46, 
at 2325. 
 111. See SHANTON, supra note 22, at 15–17 (2019) (discussing variation in the re-
lationship between state and local election administrators and in agency size and struc-
ture). 
 112. Benson, supra note 52, at 344; Ewald, supra note 101, at 3. 
 113. Ewald, supra note 100, at 12.  Empirical studies raise concern that, in the face 
of such discretion, conscious or unconscious ideological views will influence adminis-
trators’ decision-making. Tokaji, supra note 35, at 133. 
 114. HERD & MOYNIHAN, supra note 14, at 32–33. 
 115. Michael M. Ting, A Strategic Theory of Bureaucratic Redundancy, 47 AM. J. 
POL. SCI. 274, 274–76 (2003). 
 116. Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 
125 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1155–81 (2012). 
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up to agency heads to coordinate overlapping jurisdictions and to determine 
organizational forms.117 
This is particularly true with respect to rights restoration, where there is 
little to no communication between election administrators and members of the 
criminal justice system.118  The interaction required between election officials, 
state courts, corrections officers, and probation systems poses administrative 
barriers to rights restoration.119  For example, after Florida passed Amendment 
4, the Secretary of State failed to update voter registration forms for eight 
months.120  This left potential voters, county supervisors, and corrections and 
probation officers to make decisions about eligibility that contradicted forms 
provided by the state.  In response to this procedural and similar confusion, the 
state legislature considered allocating $2 million to hire more administrators 
on the Florida Commission on Offender Review to help evaluate applications 
and provide information to local supervisors of elections.121 
B.  Individual Experience with the Administrative State 
Just as election administration imposes costs on administrators, policy 
implementation imposes burdens on individual citizens.  State and local gov-
ernments’ construction and implementation of voting and election rules and 
processes affect how citizens experience administrative burden.122  Even in the 
unlikely event all administrators implement such rules equally, the effects of 
administration will be different depending upon citizen characteristics.123  A 
citizen’s decision whether to seek public benefits or to engage with government 
officials depends in part on that individual’s resources and interpretation of the 
people and processes that control the encounter.124  Accounting for the citizen 
  
 117. See Jennifer Nou, Intra-Agency Coordination, 129 HARV. L. REV. 421, 427 
(2015). 
 118. Wood & Bloom, supra note 59, at 9. 
 119. Wallace, supra note 54, at 680–81. 
 120. See, e.g., Patricia Mazzei, Their Rights Restored, Felons in Florida Begin Reg-
istering to Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2019, at A10. 
 121. Lawrence & Mahoney, supra note 93.  The final text of the Voting Rights 
Restoration Act, passed by the legislature and sent to the governor for signature on May 
3, 2019, mandates change to the uniform statewide voter education application.  SB 
7066, 2019 Cong., 1st Sess. (Fla. 2019) (amending Fl. St. § 97.052 (2019)). 
 122. HERD & MOYNIHAN, supra note 14, at 21–22. 
 123. Brodkin & Majmunder, supra note 75, at 832, 843.   
 124. Carolyn Y. Barnes & Julia R. Henly, “They Are Underpaid and Under-
staffed:” How Clients Interpret Encounters with Street-Level Bureaucrats, 28 J. PUB. 
ADMIN. RES. THEORY 165, 165 (2018). 
 
19
Selin: The Best Laid Plans: How Administrative Burden Complicates Voting
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository,
1018 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol.  84 
characteristics that affect this interpretation, particularly for the socially and 
economically disadvantaged, is a key aspect of policy implementation.125 
Individual experience is especially important with respect to voting and 
rights restoration.  Temporary voting bans may be permanent in practice as 
informal obstacles bar citizens from regaining rights.126  The individual expe-
riences of disenfranchised citizens illustrate this point.  For example, in most 
cases, an overwhelming majority of citizens with felony convictions do not 
register to vote even after their rights are restored.127  Through their interactions 
with government and public officials, citizens learn lessons about how citizens 
and governments interact; public programs communicate information about 
citizen status and government process.128  For many citizens, the criminal jus-
tice system is the most frequent, visible, and direct government contact.129  The 
civic education provided by that contact can place learning, compliance, and 
psychological burdens on individuals who seek to engage with other aspects of 
government.   
1.  Learning Costs 
Individuals who wish to engage in some sort of civic activity must spend 
time and effort learning about the activity, identifying access points, ascertain-
ing eligibility, and satisfying procedural requirements.130  With respect to vot-
ing, citizens must collect information about how, where, and when to register 
and vote.131  A lack of or inaccurate information about voting rights and 
  
 125. James Fossett & Frank J. Thompson, Administrative Responsiveness to the 
Disadvantaged: The Case of Children’s Health Insurance, 16 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. 
THEORY 369, 371 (2005). 
 126. Allen, supra note 50, at 389; Cammett, supra note 80, at 353. 
 127. E.g., Marc Meredith & Michael Morse, Why Letting Ex-Felons Vote Probably 
Won’t Swing Florida, VOX (Nov. 2, 2018),  
https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2018/11/2/18049510/felon-voting-rights-amend-
ment-4-florida [perma.cc/JPS2-FTZX]; Editorial, Virginia Makes Every Voter Count, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/17/opinion/virginia-
makes-every-voter-count.html [perma.cc/4K2F-9TYL]. 
 128. Joe Soss, Lessons of Welfare: Policy Design, Political Learning, and Political 
Action, 93 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 363, 364, 376 (1999). 
 129. Vesla M. Weaver & Amy E. Lerman, Political Consequences of the Carceral 
State, 104 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 817, 818 (2010). 
 130. HERD & MOYNIHAN, supra note 14, at 23; Henry E. Brady, Sidney Verba & 
Kay Lehman Schlozman, Beyond SES: A Resource Model of Political Participation, 89 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 271, 272 (1995); Moynihan et al., supra note 17, at 48. 
 131. RAYMOND E. WOLFINGER & STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE, WHO VOTES? 8 (1980) 
(“These are not costless acts; at the very least they require forfeiting or postponing the 
opportunity to do something else that might be more pleasurable.”); Ethan Porter & Jon 
C. Rogowski, Partisanship, Bureaucratic Responsiveness, and Election Administra-
tion: Evidence from a Field Experiment, 28 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. THEORY 602, 602 
(2018).   
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registration is a real concern among citizens with felony convictions.132  In 
Florida, citizens with felony convictions struggle to interpret the conditions for 
registration, even after the passage of legislation designed to clarify the pro-
cess.133 
Given the limitations related to administrative capacity outlined above, 
many states shift the burden of ascertaining eligibility and satisfying the pro-
cedural requirements for rights restoration to citizens.  For example, in budget 
negotiations following the passage of Amendment 4, Florida State Senator Jeff 
Brandes said, “Obviously, the individual is responsible for determining 
whether they’ve completed all the terms of their own sentence.  If they have 
questions, they should go to the local supervisors of elections.”134  Not only do 
Florida citizens with felony records likely have to check with local supervisors 
of elections regarding rights restoration, but citizens must check their official 
case status online with the county court and, for cases at least twenty years old, 
may need to travel to the courthouse to view their case file in person.135  Learn-
ing costs such as these, combined with the recognized costs associated with 
registering to vote generally, discourage legally eligible voters from register-
ing.136  
  
 132. Marc Mauer, Felon Voting Disenfranchisement: A Growing Collateral Con-
sequence of Mass Incarceration, 12 FED. SENT’G REP. 248, 251 (2000); Meredith & 
Morse, supra note 100, at 43; Wallace, supra note 54, at 681; Ernest Drucker & Ricardo 
Barreras, Studies of Voting Behavior and Felony Disenfranchisement Among Individu-
als in the Criminal Justice System in New York, Connecticut, and Ohio, THE SENT’G 
PROJECT 8–9 (2005), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/sp/fd_studiesvotingbehav-
ior.pdf [perma.cc/L3ND-QGX4]. 
 133. Elina Shirazi, Florida’s Felons Face Unexpected Obstacles Before Voting in 
2020, FOX NEWS (July 31, 2019), https://www.foxnews.com/politics/after-new-bill-
floridas-former-felons-face-unexpected-obstacles-before-voting-in-2020 
[perma.cc/3TQH-Z4H6]. 
 134. Mower & Mahoney, supra note 93.  In another example, Virginia’s governor 
announced rights restoration in 2016, but the state gave priority to those individuals 
who specifically requested such restoration. Press Release, Governor McAuliffe’s Res-
toration of Rights Policy (Aug. 22, 2016), https://www.governor.virginia.gov/news-
room/all-releases/2017/mcauliffe-administration/headline-826606-en.html 
[perma.cc/8SP3-5ZNB]. 
 135. Langston Taylor, How Felons Can Register to Vote in Florida Under New 
Amendment 4 Bill, TAMPA BAY TIMES (May 26, 2019), https://www.tampa-
bay.com/florida-politics/buzz/2019/05/26/how-felons-can-register-to-vote-in-florida-
under-new-amendment-4-law/ [perma.cc/C779-2LD8]. 
 136. Estelle H. Rogers, Restoring Voting Rights to Former Felons, PROJECT VOTE 
1 (2014), http://www.projectvote.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/POLICY-PAPER-
FELON-RESTORATION-MARCH-2014.pdf/ [perma.cc/UF8V-42Y5]. 
Conversely, information outreach can increase registration.  Alan S. Gerber, Gregory 
A. Huber, Marc Meredith, Daniel R. Biggers & David J. Hendry, Can Incarcerated 
Felons Be (Re)integrated into the Political System? Results from a Field Experiment, 
59 AM. J. POL. SCI. 912, 913, 915–17 (2015) (discussing effects of packet of infor-
mation about registering to vote ex-offenders receive when leaving prison). 
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Administrators, purposefully or not, can increase or decrease the costs 
associated with acquiring this information.137  An increase in these costs is par-
ticularly problematic if administrators have some discretion in the performance 
of their jobs, as that discretion may result in differential treatment across spe-
cific groups of citizens.138  Discretion can allow individual level factors to in-
fluence administrative decision-making.  For example, the discretion built into 
voter identification laws allows for election administrators to, consciously or 
subconsciously, act upon racial stereotypes.139  Evidence suggests that local 
election officials provide different information about voter ID laws to potential 
voters of different ethnicities.140  If similar patterns exist with respect to the 
provision of information about voter eligibility, then the racial or other biases 
of administrators may lead to differential treatment of citizens with felony con-
victions.  Classification of citizens as “felons” reinforces social stereotypes by 
making status a salient factor in decision-making.141  These stereotypes are 
only exacerbated by the fact that citizens who have extended contact with the 
criminal justice system tend to come from lower socio-economic back-
grounds142 and from ethnic minorities.143 
  
 137. Sebastian Jilke, Wouter Van Dooren & Sabine Rys, Discrimination and Ad-
ministrative Burden in Public Service Markets: Does a Public-Private Difference Exist, 
28 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. THEORY 423, 424 (2018); Porter & Rogowski, supra note 131, 
at 603. 
 138. Lonna Rae Atkeson et al., A New Barrier to Participation: Heterogeneous Ap-
plication of Voter Identification Policies, 29 ELEC. STUD. 66, 71 (2010); Katherine Lev-
ine Einstein & David M. Glick, Does Race Affect Access to Government Services? An 
Experiment Exploring Street-Level Bureaucrats and Access to Public Housing, 61 AM. 
J. POL. SCI. 100, 101 (2017); Rose Ernst, Linda Nguyen & Kamilah C. Taylor, Citizen 
Control: Race at the Welfare Office, 94 SOC. SCI. Q. 1283, 1305 (2013); Jilke et al., 
supra note 137, at 424–25; Keiser & Soss, supra note 11, at 1134; Sanford F. Schrom, 
Joe Soss, Richard C. Fording & Linda Houser, Deciding to Discipline: Race, Choice, 
and Punishment at the Frontlines of Welfare Reform, 74 AM. SOC. REV. 398, 401 
(2009); see also Lipsky, supra note 11, at 3–6 (describing how largely obscure admin-
istration of social policy through routine activity can attenuate the relationship between 
the state and its citizens); Ariel R. White, Noah L. Nathan & Julie K. Faller, What Do 
I Need to Vote? Bureaucratic Discretion and Discrimination by Local Election Offi-
cials, 109 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 129, 130 (2015) (finding that differences in resource 
constraints or professionalization of administrators cannot explain bias in providing in-
formation about voting procedures). 
 139. Atkeson et al., supra note 138, at 70. 
 140. White et al., supra note 138, at 130. 
 141. See Cecilia L. Ridgeway, Why Status Matters for Inequality, 79 AM. SOC. REV. 
1, 4–5 (2014). 
 142. E.g., Adam Looney & Nicholas Turner, Work and Opportunity Before and Af-
ter Incarceration, ECON. STUDIES AT BROOKINGS 8–10; 12–16 (2018), 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/es_20180314_looneyincar-
ceration_final.pdf [perma.cc/V4T4-CVZ4]. 
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2.  Compliance Costs 
Even if individuals overcome the learning costs associated with rights res-
toration, there are compliance burdens as well.  Compliance costs include the 
provision of documentation to demonstrate eligibility and the financial cost of 
accessing services.144  The compliance costs associated with voting are well 
documented.145  The institutional requirement of first registering to vote and 
then voting creates two separate processes that differ in time, place, and kind 
to which citizens must dedicate resources.146  Just as with learning costs, citi-
zens vary in their ability to allocate resources to registration and voting, and as 
a result, reforms designed to lower compliance costs often have dissimilar ef-
fects on different groups of citizens.147  Empirical evidence suggests that reg-
istration reforms often have disparate impacts because of variation in citizens’ 
ability to assume the costs of voting.148  
With respect to the restoration of voting rights for citizens with a felony 
conviction, one particular aspect of compliance cost has received the most at-
tention.  Many states require citizens to complete payment of restitution, court 
costs, and other judicial debt to regain voter eligibility.149  The implementing 
legislation related to Amendment 4 provides an example.  The law requires that 
citizens must complete all terms of the sentence related to their felony convic-
tions, including (a) release from imprisonment; (b) termination of probation, 
community control, or any term ordered by a court as part of the sentence; and 
(c) termination of any supervision, including full payment of restitution, fines, 
  
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/analysis/2019_05_FloridaAmend-
ment_FINAL-3.pdf [perma.cc/484F-M2AT] (finding that over 40 percent of individu-
als released from prison in Florida were black). 
 144. HERD & MOYNIHAN, supra note 14, at 23. 
 145. E.g., ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 36–50; 260–
276 (1957); William H. Riker & Peter C. Ordeshook, A Theory of the Calculus of Vot-
ing, 62 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 25, 26 (1968). 
 146. WOLFINGER & ROSENSTONE, supra note 131, at 8–9 (1980); G. Bingham Pow-
ell, Jr., American Voter Turnout in Comparative Perspective, 80 AM. POL. SCI. R. 17, 
26 (1986); Richard J. Timpone, Structure, Behavior, and Voter Turnout in the United 
States, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 145, 145 (1998).  As of January 2019, sixteen states and 
the District of Columbia allow qualified citizens to register and vote on the same day. 
Same Day Voter Registration, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGIS. (Apr. 17, 2019), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/same-day-registration.aspx 
[perma.cc/4UCD-MFC3].  An additional state (North Carolina) permits same day reg-
istration for some early voting, but not on Election Day. Id. 
 147. See, e.g., Stephen Knack & James White, Election-Day Registration and Turn-
out Inequality, 22 POL. BEHAV. 29, 41 (2000). 
 148. Id.  
 149. E.g., Cammett, supra note 80, at 387–91; Colgan, supra note 49, at 66–85; 
Keller, supra note 58, at 212–16 (2006); Jill E. Simmons, Beggars Can’t be Voters: 
Why Washington’s Felon Re-enfranchisement Law Violates the Equal Protection 
Clause, 78 WASH. L. REV. 297, 318–20 (2003). 
 
23
Selin: The Best Laid Plans: How Administrative Burden Complicates Voting
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository,
1022 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol.  84 
and fees.150  Opponents of the legislation argue that the requirement creates 
compliance costs that run contrary to the spirit of the Amendment and that the 
legislation will have a disparate impact on those who lack the resources to pay 
such costs.151 
3.  Psychological Costs 
In addition to learning and compliance costs, a well-discussed aspect of 
the administrative burden of felon disenfranchisement and rights restoration is 
psychological cost.  In the context of burden, psychological costs result from 
the stigma that comes from applying for and/or participating in a particular 
government program, the frustration that often results from interaction with 
public officials, the stresses that arise from negotiating complex processes, and 
the loss of individual autonomy that can accompany intrusive administrative 
procedures.152  Citizens can see government as a pervasive presence in their 
lives, particularly if they have limited resources.153  Citizen-government inter-
action can reinforce an individual’s perception that she lacks political power 
and social standing.154  In response, regardless of want or need, citizens may 
opt out of government participation to avoid the psychological burden.155 
Administrative practices can become degrading, intrusive, and directive, 
erode citizen autonomy, and create the perception that interaction with the gov-
ernment only goes one way.156  Through experience, citizens can view admin-
istrators as sovereign actors who are unresponsive to individual needs and who 
render objections to policy both futile and unwise.157  As a result, citizens’ lim-
ited options are compliance or exit.158 
  
 150. SB 7066, 2019 Cong., 1st Sess. (Fla. 2019) (amending Fl. St. § 97.052 (2019)). 
 151. Daniel A. Gross, The Fight for Voting Rights in Florida Isn’t Over, NEW 
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islature Approves Bill Requiring Felons to Pay Fines and Fees Before Voting, VOX 
(May 3, 2019), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/5/3/18528564/amend-
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Waive Costs, TAMPA BAY TIMES (May 2, 2019), https://www.tampabay.com/florida-
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 152. HERD & MOYNIHAN, supra note 14, at 13. 
 153. Soss, supra note 128, at 366. 
 154. Moynihan et al., supra note 17, at 50. 
 155. Jones et al., supra note 82, at 151; Moynihan, et al., supra note 17, at 49. 
 156. HERD & MOYNIHAN, supra note 14, at 25 (2018); Moynihan et al., supra note 
17, at 49. 
 157. Soss, supra note 128, at 367 (1999). 
 158. Id. at 366. 
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The stigma of a felony conviction and the accompanying loss of the right 
to vote reinforce these psychological costs.159  Interactions with the criminal 
justice system often influence a citizen’s perception of her own autonomy and 
political standing; government becomes a place where officials make decisions 
affecting citizens’ lives without their input and where process can objectify and 
alienate.160  Indeed, the legal and political justification of disenfranchisement 
policy hinges on categorization of citizens and reinforces the idea of felons as 
a separate class or group.161  Given this, and the fact that the right to vote is 
itself a social convention,162 the psychological cost of a felony record likely 
inhibits voting registration.163  As put by one individual with a felony convic-
tion when asked about his ability to vote, “I don’t even think about it actually 
. . . I mean I’ve been failing at that kind of stuff for so long, I just assume I 
can’t vote.  I don’t think I can have that right ever again.”164 
C.  Policymaking Through Administration 
The combination of the influence of administrative capacity and individ-
ual experience on policy implementation suggests that administrative burden 
is “policymaking by other means.”165  Changes in administrative burden can 
generate behavioral responses in both administrators and citizens that result in 
specific policy outcomes.166  Yet administrative burden is poorly understood 
  
 159. MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 58, at 151–55; Ariel White, Misdemeanor Dis-
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Ifeoma Ajunwa, The Modern Day Scarlet Letter, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2999, 3006 
(2015) (“Because of their stigmatizing effects, the collateral legal consequences of 
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 160. Vesla M. Weaver & Amy E. Lerman, Political Consequences of the Carceral 
State, 104 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 817, 818–19 (2010); Rogers, supra note 136, at 5.  
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(2005); Cammett, supra note 80, at 370–75; Christopher Uggen, Jeff Manza & Melissa 
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ers, 605 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI 281, 299–303 (2006). 
 162. EWALD, supra note 33, at 9. 
 163. ALEXANDER, supra note 159, at 160–64; MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 58, at 
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 164. David S. McCahon, Combating Misinformation in the Ex-Felon Population: 
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by the public, making it extremely valuable as a policy tool.167  Policymakers 
can alter administrative burden with seemingly neutral statutory or regulatory 
language presented as apolitical procedural fixes.168  For example, Florida State 
Senator Dennis Baxley, chair of the Florida Senate Ethics and Elections Com-
mittee, stressed that there is a role for politicians in rights restoration because 
“procedures are needed.”169 
There are few policy areas where considerations of administrative burden 
are of more consequence than in election administration.  Election law and ad-
ministration tends to be couched in neutral language and promoted as designed 
to improve managerial goals such as efficiency or to pursue democratic val-
ues.170  However, “[e]lections are contests for power and, as such, it is natural 
that politics will influence every part of the contest, including the administra-
tion of elections.”171  Political self-interest is the predominant motivation be-
hind most election legislation,172 and attitudes towards administrative burden 
are relatively predictable; the policy preferences of political actors correlate 
with stances on the nature of burden and the distribution of cost across citizens 
and government.173   
Certainly, this is true when it comes to felon disenfranchisement and 
rights restoration policy.  Discussion of the topic inevitably leads to speculation 
about the partisan leanings of citizens with felony convictions and the electoral 
consequences.  For example, in the debate surrounding the passage of Amend-
ment 4, Professors Marc Meredith and Michael Morse estimated that, if all 
Florida citizens with felony convictions had been eligible to vote in the 2016 
elections, there would have been approximately 102,000 additional votes for 
the Democratic Party, 54,000 more votes for the Republican Party, and 40,000 
surplus votes that could have been cast for either party.174  If correct, these 
estimates signal meaningful differences in a state where about 100,000 votes 
decided the last presidential election (2016), 10,000 votes the last Senate elec-
tion (2018), and 30,000 votes the last governor’s election (2018).175  This 
  
 167. Moynihan et al., supra note 17, at 52–53.   
 168. HERD & MOYNIHAN, supra note 14, at 35–36. 
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suggests that adjusting the statutory language that influences administrative 
burden can have real political consequences.   
III.  ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN IN ACTION: FLORIDA’S AMENDMENT 4  
The implementation of Florida’s Amendment 4 provides an example of 
the implications of administrative burden for the restoration of voting rights for 
citizens with felony convictions.176  Like all states, Florida has limited re-
sources and therefore the State and its local governments must balance the use 
of these resources and the protection of important public values.  Because 
Amendment 4 is targeted to address the needs of a subset of the population and 
to enable the participation of that population, implementation is administra-
tively costly. 
Amendment 4 went into effect on January 8, 2019.177  However, questions 
arose among policymakers and administrators regarding interpretation and im-
plementation of the Amendment.178  On May 3, 2019, the Florida State Legis-
lature passed a bill designed to address some of the administrative challenges 
posed by Amendment 4.179  Governor Ron DeSantis signed the bill into law on 
June 28, 2019.180  An examination of the law’s provisions and consideration of 
the state’s administrative capacity, citizen experiences, and political circum-
stances illuminates the potential effects of the legislation.  
A.  Provisions of Implementing Legislation 
First, the law addresses voter applications and requires that the Secretary 
of State change the uniform statewide voter registration application to include 
three different categories into which a citizen must place herself: applicant has 
never been convicted of a felony; applicant has been convicted of a felony and 
her rights have been restored by the Board of Executive Clemency; or applicant 





 176. See Lawrence Mower, Amendment 4: The House is Hearing the First Bill To-
morrow.  Here’s What’s In It, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Mar. 18, 2019), https://www.tampa-
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the Same As Murder?, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Mar. 12, 2019), https://www.tampa-
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 178. E.g., id.; Mower, supra note 176.  
 179. Voting Rights Restoration Act, SB 7066, 2019 Cong., 1st Sess. (Fla. 2019) 
[hereinafter Voting Rights Restoration Act] (amending Fl. St. § 97.052 (2019)). 
 180. DeSantis, supra note 6. 
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Amendment 4.181  Once the citizen places herself into one of the three catego-
ries, the supervisor of elections for the county in which the citizen resides must 
determine whether the applicant is eligible to vote.182  With respect to felony 
convictions, a citizen is not eligible unless she has completed all terms of her 
sentences as contained in the four corners of her sentencing document.183  This 
includes release from imprisonment; termination of probation or community 
control; fulfillment of any term as ordered by the court as part of her sentence; 
termination from any supervision; and full payment of restitution, fines, or 
fees.184  In order to aid each county supervisor of elections in determining eli-
gibility, the law provides for the Department of State to compare “information 
received from, but not limited to, a clerk of the circuit court, the Board of Ex-
ecutive Clemency, the Department of Corrections, the Department of Law En-
forcement, or a United States Attorney’s Office.”185 
The law also requires administrators to provide information to citizens.  
The Department of Corrections shall inform and educate inmates and offenders 
on community supervision about the restoration of rights and notify citizens of 
outstanding sentence terms upon release from incarceration, probation, or com-
munity control.186  Additionally, the Florida Commission on Offender Review 
must notify a citizen of all the outstanding terms of her sentence at the time of 
termination of Commission supervision.187  To assist the Commission with this 
task, the Department of Corrections must send the Commission a monthly elec-
tronic list of the names of individuals who may be eligible for rights restora-
tion.188 
Recognizing that the changes provided by the new law likely will result 
in unforeseen complications to the restoration process, the legislature mandated 
the creation of a Restoration of Voting Rights Work Group within the Depart-
ment of State.189  This Work Group, comprised of individuals from the Depart-
ments of Corrections, Law Enforcement, and State, the Florida Commission on 
Offender Review, state circuit courts, and county supervisors of elections, shall 
conduct a comprehensive review of the process of verifying potential voters 
who may be eligible for restoration of voting rights.190  The Work Group must 
submit a report to the legislature by November 1, 2019, providing recommen-
dations related to the consolidation of data relevant to the implementation of 
Amendment 4 and the process of informing citizens about eligibility.191 
  
 181. Voting Rights Restoration Act § 21 (amending Fl. St. § 97.052 (2019)). 
 182. Id. at § 23 (amending Fl. St. § 98.045(a) (2019)). 
 183. Id.  
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 189. Id. at § 33. 
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 191. Id. at § 33(4). 
 
28
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 84, Iss. 4 [], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol84/iss4/6
2019] VOTING RIGHTS 1027 
B.  Administrative Complications 
While the law does provide some procedural framework for the imple-
mentation of Amendment 4, administrators still have considerable latitude in 
creating the formal rules and procedures that will govern rights restoration.  
This leeway, combined with the informal rules and norms that will inevitably 
develop as a result, can influence the de facto restoration of rights.192  In the 
face of discretion, administrators who perceive a higher administrative burden 
reduce the chances of policy implementation.193  For example, the Secretary of 
State can determine whether to offset some of the burdens created by the stat-
utory requirements for voting eligibility and registration with efforts to pro-
mote participation.194  Yet, this creates additional burden for administrators.  
Therefore, it is equally possible that the Secretary of State may increase citizen 
costs by administering statutory requirements in a way that increases barriers 
to access.195  An examination of the law’s likely impact on administrative ca-
pacity, individual factors, and political implications suggests that administra-
tive burden will likely impede voting rights restoration in Florida. 
1.  Administrative Capacity 
First, the law involves three different types of administrative agencies – 
those in charge of the coordination of election policy (e.g., Department of 
State); those in charge of election administration (e.g., county election super-
visors and offices); and those that are part of the criminal justice system (e.g. 
Florida Commission on Offender Review).196  If all agencies do not have the 
same capacity, or capacity is unevenly distributed across or within units, then 
problems with policy implementation will likely arise as administrators who 
perceive a higher burden will oppose new policy adoption and support shifting 
administrative tasks to other units.197  While coordination between the agencies 
can help alleviate some concern, the law largely leaves communication up to 
agency heads.  For example, the law requires various units to share information 
relating to voter eligibility but does not mandate a procedure for doing so.198 
Each of these agencies has a finite amount of financial resources, and it 
is unlikely that future budget allocations will reflect the additional tasks the law 
requires of the agencies.  At a minimum, the Secretary of State must change 
voter registration forms to reflect new statutory language and ensure the use of 
those new forms.  This is no small task, as the state has a history of problems 
  
 192. See Keiser & Soss, supra note 11, at 1138. 
 193. Burden et al., supra note 30, at 749. 
 194. Benson, supra note 52, at 367–68. 
 195. Id. at 367. 
 196. Voting Rights Restoration Act § 33. 
 197. Burden et al., supra note 30, at 749. 
 198. Voting Rights Restoration Act § 25. 
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resulting from county supervisors’ of elections delay in the implementation of 
policy changes.199  In addition to adopting the new voter registration materials, 
county supervisors of elections will also have to invest resources in processes 
to determine voter eligibility and to sift through information provided by other 
agencies.  While these tasks are related to the agencies’ central purpose, the 
tasks allocated to the Departments of Corrections, Law Enforcement, and Flor-
ida Commission on Offender Review are arguably indirectly connected to their 
missions.  The Florida Department of Corrections oversees the third largest 
prison system in the country;200 the Florida Department of Law Enforcement’s 
primary mission is to promote public safety;201 and the Florida Commission on 
Offender Review serves as a quasi-judicial body that makes determinations re-
garding parole and other releases.202  When faced with the tasks directly related 
to these missions and the additional burden of rights restoration, administrators 
are likely to pass the costs of restoration to citizens. 
Furthermore, the budgets of the Departments of Corrections and Law En-
forcement and the Florida Commission on Offender Review have remained 
relatively stable over time, with slight increases in the 2018–19 budget that are 
unrelated to the restoration of voting rights for citizens with felony convic-
tions.203  The Department of State’s elections budget was more than double that 
of years similarly placed in the election cycle.204  However, 54% of that budget 
($20,392,786.75) came from federal grants, and over 75% of those grants 
($15,450,000.00) was dedicated to election security.205  The legislature only 
allocated $2 million to county supervisors of elections for use in all election 
  
 199. FL. DEP’T OF STATE, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INCREASED ACCESSIBILITY & 
EFFICIENCY IN FLORIDA ELECTIONS 6–7 (2013), https://dos.myflorida.com/me-
dia/693815/secretarys-report-on-recommendations-2013.pdf [perma.cc/J8AT-83DJ] 
(noting county supervisor delay in implementing changes relating to realignment of 
precincts, ballots, and election technology). 
 200. About the Florida Department of Corrections, FLA. DEP’T OF CORR., 
http://www.dc.state.fl.us/about.html [perma.cc/WT4F-SGE3]. 
 201. About FDLE, FLA. DEP’T OF LAW ENF’T, https://www.fdle.state.fl.us/About-
Us/About-Us.aspx [perma.cc/G99B-3XK6]. 
 202. Organization Overview, FLA. COMM’N ON OFFENDER REV., 
https://www.fcor.state.fl.us/overview.shtml [perma.cc/D56P-65G7]. 
 203. Fla. Dep’t of Corr. Operating Budget 2018–2019, FLA. EXEC. OFF. OF THE 
GOVERNOR, http://transparencyflorida.gov/Operat-
ingBudget/Ledger.aspx?FY=19&BE=70000000&OB=Y&SC=F [perma.cc/3KGT-
4HTG]; Fla. Dep’t of Law Enf. Operating Budget & Fla. Comm’n on Offender Review 
2018–19 Operating Budget, FLA. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, http://transparen-
cyflorida.gov/OperatingBudget/Agency.aspx?FY=19&BE=78000000&SC=F 
[perma.cc/BSS7-8GRB]. 
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administration activities and limited fund distribution to those counties that 
provided certification of matching funds in an amount equal to 15% of the 
amount to be received from the state.206 
In addition to financial constraints, these agencies (and their administra-
tors) face expertise and organizational challenges.  Understanding the require-
ments contained in the law necessitates legal analysis and a knowledge of 
where to look to access information about voter eligibility.  Yet, any experience 
administrators gain over time relating to voter eligibility and registration is 
likely routinized and not policy-specific.  Training and guidance documents 
can help overcome this lack of administrative expertise, but the law does not 
provide for such instruction.  When administrators are faced with a multitude 
of tasks and limited resources and knowledge, they are likely to choose to per-
form tasks with which they have familiarity rather than devoting energy to ac-
quiring new expertise.   
The organizational structure of Florida’s electoral system only exacer-
bates the problem.  Consider, for example, the Department of State.  The Sec-
retary of State serves as chief election officer207 and has the legal responsibility 
for “implementing, operating, and maintaining, in a uniform and nondiscrimi-
natory manner, a single, uniform, official, centralized, interactive, computer-
ized statewide voter registration system.”208  Yet, elections are not the Secre-
tary’s sole policy focus.  The Department of State consists of six divisions 
tasked with wide authority, from formalizing the legal standing of Florida busi-
nesses to promoting funding and programs for the arts.209  The division of the 
Department of State responsible for the election administration is the Florida 
Division of Elections, which itself consist of three subunits.210  None of these 
subunits are directly responsible for voter registration, which is delegated to 
local supervisors of elections.  The Division of Elections’ Bureau of Voter Reg-
istration Services assists county Supervisors of Elections with the voter regis-
tration process, but it does not control the appointment, removal, or funding of 
those Supervisors.  Each Supervisor of Elections is elected by voters in her 
county and the county’s board of county commissioners pays her compensa-
tion.211 
Such a complicated organizational scheme can create coordination and 
implementation problems.  Even if one set of administrators devotes time and 
energy into understanding the new legal framework implementing Amendment 
4, another set of administrators within the same agency may thwart their efforts 
due to differential organizational missions, resources, and expertise.    
  
 206. S.B. 2500, 2019 Cong, 1st Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2019). 
 207. Fla. St. § 97.012 (2019). 
 208. Fla. St. § 98.035(1) (2019). 
 209. About the Department, FLA. DEP’T OF STATE, https://dos.myflor-
ida.com/about-the-department/ [perma.cc/EH4J-X4ZK] (last visited Aug. 25, 2019). 
 210. About Us, FLA. DIV. OF ELEC., https://dos.myflorida.com/about-the-depart-
ment/ [perma.cc/9WJP-UQXR]. 
 211. Fla. St. § 98.015(1)–(2) (2019). 
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2.  Individual Experience 
Second, even if administrative capacity did not provide roadblocks to ad-
ministration, citizens’ interpretation of the processes necessitated by the law 
likely will inhibit restoration of voting rights to citizens with felony convic-
tions.  The individual learning and compliance costs inherent in the law are 
quite high.  Florida has prevented citizens with felony convictions from voting 
for the past 150 years.212  Even in the wake of a public campaign advertising 
the passage of Amendment 4, citizens with felony convictions may not be 
aware of its effects.  Public attention to the Amendment largely focuses on 
those who already know the potential implications of Amendment 4, as op-
posed to providing less politically engaged citizens with information regarding 
voter registration.213  Groups such as Florida Rights Restoration Coalition rec-
ognize this problem and are working on visiting communities and encouraging 
civic participation: “We basically remind everybody that the impact of Amend-
ment 4 is intact, that the lifetime ban is history, and we’re now looking at a 
situation where we have about 800,000-plus who are immediately eligible, and 
about 500,000-plus who are not yet eligible because of financial obliga-
tions.”214   
The citizens in the latter category, who are not eligible for rights restora-
tion because of outstanding court fines, fees, or restitution, have received con-
siderable attention in recent months.  As discussed above, these obligations are 
a type of compliance cost that may prevent individuals with felony convictions 
from being able to restore their voting rights.215  Estimates from the Florida 
court system suggest that over 80% of financial obligations will remain unpaid 
because the defendant does not have the resources to do so.216  As put by Julie 
Ebenstein, a senior staff attorney with the American Civil Liberties Union 
(“ACLU”) Voting Rights Project, the administrative barriers in the law “nearly 
guarantee that people will miss election after election . . . because they cannot 
  
 212. Letitia Stein, Politics Cloud Felon Voting Rights Restoration in Florida, 
REUTERS (Dec. 15, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-florida-felons/poli-
tics-cloud-felon-voting-rights-restoration-in-florida-idUSKBN1OE0C 
[perma.cc/5HVZ-3BZM]. 
 213. Maruam Saleh, How Some Florida Prosecutors are Pushing Back Against 
GOP Voter Suppression Efforts, THE INTERCEPT (July 15, 2019), https://theinter-
cept.com/2019/07/15/florida-voting-rights-amendment-4/ [perma.cc/D9FX-5FPA] 
(statement of Neil Volz, deputy director of the Florida Rights Restoration Coalition). 
 214. Id. (statement of Neil Volz, deputy director of the Florida Rights Restoration 
Coalition). 
 215. Id.  
 216. Daniel Rivero, Felons Might Have to Pay Hundreds of Millions Before Being 
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afford to pay financial obligations[.]”217   On June 28, 2019, in conjunction 
with the ACLU, the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, and the Bren-
nan Center for Justice, a group of citizens who have outstanding financial ob-
ligations sued Florida election officials over the constitutionality of the new 
law.218  The plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that the law’s requirement that a citi-
zen must pay all outstanding judicial debt before her rights are automatically 
restored under Amendment 4 violates the First, Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and 
Twenty-Fourth Amendments of the United States Constitution.219  In its Order 
Granting a Preliminary Injunction, the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Florida held that Florida cannot deny rights restoration 
because an individual does not have the financial resources to pay outstanding 
debt.220   
In addition to the learning and compliance costs, there are also large psy-
chological costs to rights restoration in Florida.  Most discussion of Amend-
ment 4 and its implementing legislation reinforces the notion of citizens with 
felony convictions as a separate class of citizens.  For example, in debate over 
provisions of the law, State Representative James Grant argued on the House 
floor, “The affected class disenfranchised themselves when they committed a 
crime.”221  Rhetoric such as this, combined with the fact that citizens must sep-
arately identify themselves on voter registration forms, make citizens more 
likely to opt out of government participation.  Indeed, the plaintiffs in the suit 
challenging the constitutionality of the law argued that the law’s effect is 
  
 217. Jane C. Timm, Florida Republicans Move to Limit Felon Voting Rights De-




 218. Complaint, Gruver v. Barton et al., No. 1:19-CV-00121 (N.D. Fla. June 28, 
2019) (consolidated with Jones et al. v. Desantis et al., No. 4:19-CV-00300, 2019 WL 
5295192 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 18, 2019)). 
 219. Id. (First Amendment-based claims for relief include unconstitutional burden 
on core political speech and associational rights.  Fourteenth Amendment-based claims 
for relief include: violation of the doctrine of fundamental fairness; unconstitutional 
discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause; unconstitutional burden on 
the right to vote; violations of procedural due process; and intentional race discrimina-
tion.  Twenty-Fourth Amendment-based claim includes unconstitutional poll tax.  The 
complaint also includes a claim for retroactive punishment in violation of the Ex Post 
Facto Clause of Article 1, Section 10 of the Constitution). 
 220. Jones et al. v. Desantis et al., No. 4:19-CV-00300, 2019 WL 5295192, at *11 
(N.D. Fla. Oct. 18, 2019).  The Court went on to state that Florida must adopt proce-
dures that permit qualified individuals to register and vote if they are unable to pay 
outstanding financial obligations. Id. at *13.    
 221. Veronica Stracqualursi, Florida House Passes Bill That Would Require Ex-





Selin: The Best Laid Plans: How Administrative Burden Complicates Voting
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository,
1032 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol.  84 
disenfranchising in part because it reinforces long-standing disparities along 
racial and socio-economic lines.222 
3.  Political Effects and Potential for Change 
When considering the balance of administrative and citizen costs associ-
ated with policy implementation, it is important to consider the political pref-
erences of the actors involved in administrative policymaking.223  With respect 
to implementation of Amendment 4, those actors include state legislators, the 
Secretary of State, and county election supervisors.  First, as elected officials, 
state legislators have an incentive to keep statutory language relatively 
vague.224  Legislators can claim credit for enacting vague legislation and leave 
administrators to translate a general mandate into a functioning program, a pro-
cess that inevitably involves “the trampling of numerous toes.”225  When con-
stituents become frustrated with the administration of policy, legislators can 
blame administrators and then intervene with “technical fixes.”226    
In such a system, it is important to consider whether the key administra-
tors involved in the policy process are elected or appointed.  The decentraliza-
tion and discretion inherent in election administration provides administrative 
policymakers with the opportunity to make decisions based on political 
goals.227  With respect to electoral reform, administrative preferences differ 
depending on job description and method of selection.  Policy managers tend 
to be more concerned with costs and efficiency than with normative goals such 
as equal representation.228  Elected officials are more likely to be responsive to 
public pressure.229   
  
 222. Complaint, Gruver v. Barton et al., No. 1:19-CV-00121 (N.D. Fla. June 28, 
2019). 
 223. See Daniel Palazzolo, Vincent G. Moscardelli, Meredith Patrick & Doug Rou-
bin, Election Reform after NAVA: Voter Verification in Congress and the States, 38 
PUBLIUS 515, 531 (2008). 
 224. MORRIS P. FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON 
ESTABLISHMENT 46 (2d ed. 1989). 
 225. Id. 
 226. HERD & MOYNIHAN, supra note 14, at 36. 
 227. See COMM’N ON FED. ELEC. REFORM, supra note 171, at 50; see also Richard 
C. Fording, Joe Soss & Sanford F. Schram, Devolution, Discretion, and the Effect of 
Local Political Values on TANF Sanctioning, 81 SOC. SERV. REV. 285, 286 (2007).   
 228. Moynihan, supra note 72, at 165. 
 229. Barry C. Burden, David T. Canon, Stephane Lavertu, Kenneth R. Mayer & 
Donald P. Moynihan, Selection Method, Partisanship, and the Administration of Elec-
tions, 41 AM. POL. RES. 903, 906 (2013); see also COMM’N ON FED. ELEC. REFORM, 
supra note 171, at 51 (arguing that state chief elections officers should remain insulated 
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The primary manager of election policy in Florida is the Secretary of 
State.230  In contrast to the majority of states, Florida’s Secretary of State is an 
appointed official.231  The Governor appoints the Secretary, subject to confir-
mation by the state Senate, and the Secretary serves at the pleasure of the Gov-
ernor.232  For the purposes of implementation of the law and Amendment 4, 
this is notable for two reasons.  First, gubernatorial appointment combined with 
at-will removal means that the Secretary of State likely is more responsive to 
the Governor than to any other political actor.  In this way, the Secretary pro-
vides the Governor with an opportunity to gain control over administrative pol-
icymaking and to tailor procedures to gubernatorial political interests.233  Sec-
ond, to the extent that the Secretary of State adopts policies to implement the 
law, she likely is more concerned about the managerial aspects of election ad-
ministration than about citizen responsiveness.  
Unlike the Secretary of State, each of the sixty-seven county supervisors 
of elections is elected every four years.234  In theory, this structure generates 
incentives for administrators to be more accountable to citizens’ needs and to 
support policies that reflect citizen preferences.235  However, when the burden 
to drive legislative or administrative policy change falls on citizens with little 
political clout, those citizens tend to be less successful.236  Elected officials 
have little incentive to respond to those citizens who lack political power or are 
viewed as “undeserving.”237  As a class of potential voters, citizens with felony 
convictions fall within this category and therefore have limited ability to hold 
elected administrators accountable for policy implementation.238   
  
 230. FLA. STAT. § 97.012 (2019). 
 231. SHANTON, supra note 22, at 12–13. 
 232. FLA. STAT. § 20.10(1) (2019). 
 233. See e.g. Hugh Heclo, A Government of Strangers: Executive Politics in Wash-
ington, THE BROOKINGS INST. 68–76 (1977); DAVID E. LEWIS, THE POLITICS OF 
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS (2008); Terry M. Moe, The Politicized Presidency, in 
THE NEW DIRECTION OF AMERICAN POLITICS 235, 245 (John E. Chubb & Paul E. Pe-
terson eds., 1985). 
 234. FLA. STAT. § 98.015(1) (2019).  States vary in selection and removal of local 
election administrators, but the majority of states have elected officials. Note, Toward 
a Greater State Role in Election Administration, supra note 44, at 2316. 
 235. Susan M. Miller, Administering Representation: The Role of Elected Admin-
istrators in Translating Citizens’ Preferences into Public Policy, 23 J. PUB. ADMIN. 
RES. THEORY 865, 869 (2013). 
 236. See Pamela S. Karlan, Convictions and Doubts: Retribution, Representation, 
and the Debate over Felon Disenfranchisement, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1147, 1161–62 
(2004) (arguing that disenfranchisement laws operate as a sanction that reduces the 
political clout of entire communities). 
 237. Fossett & Thompson, supra note 125, at 370; Moynihan & Herd, supra note 
12, at 663–64. 
 238. See Brodkin, supra note 63, at 20 (finding that welfare clients’ limited capacity 
for self-advocacy makes it difficult for those clients to hold the state accountable). 
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The court system provides only modest hope of remedy in this situation.  
Notably, litigation challenging administrative action is hard to pursue, particu-
larly for the economically disadvantaged.239  In the area of election administra-
tion, litigation tends to come at points of crisis, rendering the courts “less like 
an advancing army charging in to dominate a territory and more like a fire bri-
gade that has been summoned when half the building is already engulfed in 
flames.”240 
Even then, a consistent theme in election law jurisprudence is a high level 
of deference to administration, and the judicial preference for as-applied chal-
lenges give states greater discretion in their administrative processes.241  Courts 
have struggled with how to weigh administrative burden, legislative ambiguity, 
and administrative discretion, particularly in the context of voting rights.242  
This struggle is even more apparent with respect to the restoration of the voting 
rights of citizens with felony convictions.243  Before the passage of Amendment 
4, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit noted the tension between 
the potential for disparate treatment and the political consequences resulting 
from administrative burden and established standards for Equal Protection 
challenges.244  Yet the Court ultimately held that, without more, demonstration 
of a lack of administrative standards is insufficient as a legal argument.245  
  
 239. Id. at 24–25.  
 240. Wise, supra note 29, at 131–32. 
 241. Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 202–03 (2008); Wash. 
State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449–58 (2008); Joshua 
A. Douglas, The Significance to the Shift toward As-Applied Challenges in Election 
Law, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 635, 637 (2009); Ariel White, Misdemeanor Disenfranchise-
ment? The Demobilizing Effects of Brief Jail Spells on Potential Voters, 113 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. 311, 322 (2019); see also Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112, 1127–29 
(2019) (distinguishing between as-applied and facial challenges); United States v. Ste-
vens, 559 U.S. 460, 472–73 (2010) (providing for two types of facial attacks: (a) estab-
lishment that no set of circumstances exists under which a statute is constitutionally 
valid or (b) demonstration that the vast majority of applications of the statute are un-
constitutional). 
 242. HERD & MOYNIHAN, supra note 14, at 252.   
 243. See Edward B. Foley, Voting Rules and Constitutional Law, 81 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 1836, 1837–38, 1847 (2013) (a series of narrow rulings in election administra-
tion makes it difficult to articulate the appropriate framework for determining when 
state procedures violate equal protection); Simmons, supra note 149, at 310, 313–16 
(noting that re-enfranchisement is an unsettled area of law); Wallace, supra note 53, at 
680 (suggesting that procedural due process challenges may be appropriate to challenge 
felon re-enfranchisement procedures). 
 244. Hand v. Scott, 888 F.3d 1206, 1209–10 (11th Cir. 2018) (staying Hand v. 
Scott, 315 F. Supp. 3d 1244 (N.D. Fla. 2018)). 
 245. Id. at 1210.  The court noted, 
Since a standardless reenfranchisement scheme, without more, does not state a 
claim for an Equal Protection violation based on invidious discrimination, it 
likely follows that a standardless scheme, without more, cannot establish a First 
Amendment violation based on viewpoint discrimination.  While a 
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Subsequently, both parties agreed that the passage of Amendment 4 rendered 
the litigation moot because the Amendment created a non-discretionary system 
of voting rights restoration.246   
From the perspective of administrative burden, the post-Amendment 4 
actions of the plaintiffs in that case are illuminating.  Of the nine plaintiffs, two 
applied for restoration but were ineligible because of outstanding court costs.247  
A third plaintiff did not apply for restoration at all.248  Interestingly, with re-
spect to the latter, the state of Florida noted that because she had not applied 
for restoration, the state lacked “knowledge whether she has any outstanding 
obligations.”249  This means that one-third of the individuals who, by pursuing 
litigation in the first place, have revealed themselves to be exceptionally moti-
vated to regain their voting rights failed to do so after the passage of Amend-
ment 4.  One can assume that the rate of failed restoration will be even higher 
in the general population.  
CONCLUSION 
The example of Florida’s Amendment 4, subsequent legislative decisions, 
and likely citizen experience with administrative burden suggests that attention 
to statutory language of various voting rights regimes or to the constitutionality 
of felon disenfranchisement misses a significant point: the key to the success 
or failure of citizen rights restoration policy lies with the administrative state.  
Even seemingly accommodating procedural language like Florida’s inter-
agency information sharing requirement complicates the administrative pro-
cess and strains already limited agency budgets.  The combination of limited 
administrative capacity and the learning, compliance, and psychological costs 
citizens with felony convictions must pay to restore their voting rights places 
significant hurdles in the way of rights restoration.  This is not to say that rights 
restoration for disenfranchised citizens with felony convictions is impossible, 
  
discretionary felon-reenfrancisement scheme that was facially or intentionally 
designed to discriminate on viewpoint – say, for example, by barring Demo-
crats, Republicans, or socialists from reenfranchisement on account of their po-
litical affiliation – might violate the First Amendment . . . no such showing has 
been made in this case. 
Id. at 1211–12. 
 246. Supplemental Brief for Appellants at 5, Hand v. Scott, 888 F.3d 1206 (11th 
Cir. 2018) (No. 18-11388-G); Supplemental Brief for Appellees at 1, Hand v. Scott, 
888 F.3d 1206 (11th Cir. 2018) (No. 18-11388-G). 
 247. Supplemental Brief for the Appellants at 4, Hand v. Scott, 888 F.3d 1206 (11th 
Cir. 2018) (No. 18-11388-G). 
 248. Id. at 4 n.1.  As a result, parties did not have access to that Plaintiff’s CCA. Id. 
 249. Id.  One wonders how individual citizens are supposed to obtain this infor-
mation if the state of Florida lacks it.  
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or even improbable.  Just that the “focus of attention should shift from rules 
governing elections to the institutions responsible for running them.”250   
Politicians recognize the importance of institutions and how statutory or 
regulatory language presented as apolitical technical solutions to administra-
tive problems can have real policy consequences.  As noted by David A. Gra-
ham in his April 2019 piece on voting rights restoration in The Atlantic, con-
versations about voting rights in the abstract are useful for deliberate and prin-
cipled policymaking, but “hashing out the nitty-gritty” of administration is a 
political game.251  Instead of discussing rights restoration in the abstract, poli-
ticians in Florida are making consequential administrative decisions about how 
Amendment 4 will work in practice.252  This demonstrates how even the best 
laid plans often go awry in the face of administrative burden, or “policymaking 
by other means.”253 
 
  
 250. Tokaji, supra note 34, at 126; see also COMM’N ON FED. ELECTION REFORM, 
supra note 170, at 57 (“[W]e need to understand better how elections are adminis-
tered”). 
 251. David A. Graham, A Voting-Rights Debate Reveals Why Democrats Keep Los-
ing, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 25, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/ar-
chive/2019/04/democrats-republicans-felon-voting-florida/588010/ (“In short, while 
Democrats are engaged in a largely theoretical exercise on the national level, Republi-
cans are moving aggressively to achieve their political goals at the state level”).   
 252. Id.    
 253. HERD & MOYNIHAN, supra note 14, at 33. 
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